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R2P: Activating the International Community’s Responsibility to Protect by 
Shifting Focus Away from Collective Action by the Security Council 






The responsibility to protect (R2P) is an expression of policy which aims to prevent mass 
atrocities or stop them if they are underway.  Consensus on the international aspect, which 
includes when states can or should intervene to protect citizens other than their own, remains 
elusive.  An observer might well conclude that R2P is a noble idea which is short on 
effectiveness. This article will examine whether R2P can lift off and move from theory to 
practice.  How R2P has developed to date will be considered first, then the obstacles that have 
hindered its progress and how these might be circumvented.  The final focus will be on the 
elements which need to come together for R2P to be activated.  The conclusion will be reached 
that R2P can only gain real traction by looking past the Security Council to other bodies, within 
and outside the UN, to work together at the early warning and prevention stage.  Consensus on 
if and when states can intervene militarily to protect is as distant as ever.  It will also be 






R2P was an idea born out of the worst of circumstances with the best of intentions.  Its objective 
is to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.  While it is generally recognised that prevention of these crimes, including their 
incitement, by each state within its own borders is the vital and central aim,1 there has been 
disproportionate attention drawn to the international elements of the principle, in particular the 
scope for intervention into another state’s affairs.  Indeed, there has been a plethora of debate, 
UN policy documents and academic writing since R2P’s first incarnation in 20012.  However, 
fifteen years later, there is little and controversial state and Security Council (Council) practice.  
The response of the Council to the humanitarian crisis in Libya in 2011 has been used by 
proponents of R2P to advance their cause and simultaneously by detractors to support their 
view. The Council’s approach in the face of ‘massive evidence that war crimes and crimes 
against humanity had been committed’3 in Syria has exposed the limitations of the principle. 
                                                          
1 cf Thomas Weiss: ‘it is preposterous to argue that to prevent is the most important priority; the most urgent 
priority is to react better…ICISS’s discourse about prevention is a helpful clarification, but it nonetheless obscures 
the essence of the most urgent part of the spectrum of responsibility: to protect those caught in the crosshairs of 
war.’ Humanitarian Intervention (Polity Press, Cambridge 2012). 
2 The Responsibility to Protect, ICISS, (International Development Research Centre for ICISS, Ottawa 2001) 
3 High Commissioner Navi Pillay informing the Council on 2 December 2013, Syria Chronology of Events: 




The background and development of R2P, and what the principle means today, will be 
reviewed initially.  A consideration of UN policy documents, Council practice and academic 
writing will show that while the primary responsibility of states to look after their own 
populations is undisputed, the international responsibility - both to help prevent and if it is too 
late for that, to intervene in a ‘timely and decisive manner’4 - remains problematic. Where R2P 
sits within other UN protection mechanisms and initiatives will be considered, as these have 
the potential to be a positive or a negative influence by working in synergy with R2P or 
obstructing its implementation. 
 
It will be seen that the UN Charter provisions on intervention and use of force act as a legal 
brake on unilateral action5 by states and that the right to veto restricts the Council.  Without 
developments in either or both of these areas, the international element of the responsibility to 
protect appears inherently flawed in that it does not have the capacity to be fully realised in its 
current formulation.  As amendments to the Charter and restraint on the exercise of the veto 
appear exceedingly unlikely, alternative ways in which R2P may progress will be assessed.  
These will be brought together in a final review of the key elements which need to align for 
R2P to be activated.   
 
Where there has been manifest failure by a state to protect its population, R2P has not 
permeated Council thinking in any meaningful, positive way.  There seems little likelihood it 
will do so while Council structure and realpolitik remain unchanged.  The conclusion will be 
reached that R2P can only gain real traction by looking past the Council to other bodies, within 
and outside the UN, to work together at the early warning and prevention stage.  It will also be 
concluded that state practice and opinio juris point firmly against crystallisation into a legal 
norm; instead, they point towards an understanding that R2P must be accepted as a policy 
aspiration that provides a moral, not a legal, impetus to act. 
 
The birth of R2P 
 
R2P emerged from an ongoing dialogue as to whether it was ever permissible for a state to 
intervene militarily into another state’s territory to either prevent mass atrocities or stop those 
which were underway.6 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force with 
only two exceptions:  actions mandated by the Council under Chapter VII and states acting in 
individual or collective self-defence within the tight limitations of article 51.  While claims 
have been made for a humanitarian exception, this is controversial and not the majority view.7  
However, in circumstances where the Council determines that a situation constitutes a threat 
to the peace, action may be taken under Chapter VII to maintain or restore international peace 
                                                          
4 2005 World Summit Outcome, (WSO), adopted by the Assembly on 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1, para 139. 
5 Including collective action. 
6 ICISS (n2), Foreword. 
7 Yoram Dinstein, War, aggression, and self-defence (5th ed Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 73-
75, paras 195 -198. 
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and security.8  This may allow for an intervention on protection grounds, as was the case in 
Libya in 2011.   
 
Francis Deng, then Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, 
introduced the idea of a responsibility to protect in guidelines on Internal Displacement 
published in 1998.9  The first full conception was put forward by the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 in answer to a call by Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan to the international community.  The 1990s had seen the failure of the UN to act 
against genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and at Srebrenica, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1995. 
Reports highly critical of the UN in respect of Rwanda10 and Srebrenica11, were published in 
1999, the same year as NATO intervened in Kosovo without an explicit Council mandate.  
Against this backdrop, Annan hoped the international community could come to a consensus 
on how to reconcile the conflicting pulls of, on the one hand, intervention without consent12 to 
protect people at risk of, or subject to, atrocities and, on the other, sovereignty which militates 
against intervention.13  
 
What R2P means 
 
R2P is an expression of policy, its scope set out in paragraphs 138 to 140 of the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome (WSO).14  Each state has the responsibility to protect its own population 
from genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing and if it manifestly 
fails to do so the international community has a subsidiary responsibility to protect.    
 
The primary responsibility to protect is generally accepted by states.15  Reference to a state’s 
responsibility to its own population does not represent any innovation in international law.  
However, although the description ‘the emerging norm of a collective responsibility to protect’ 
was used by the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel as early as 2004, this was not 
                                                          
8 Charter of the United Nations 1945 (UN Charter), article 39.   
9 Principle 3 ‘National authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian 
assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction’ Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
(E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2). 
10 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 
S/1999/1257(1999). 
11 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly Resolutions 53/35 The fall of Srebrenica 
A/54/549(1999). 
12 Whether this is by enforcement action under Chapter VII, UN Charter or unilateral intervention by one or more 
states. 
13 ICISS (n2), Foreword. 
14 WSO (n4). 
15 The Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 2, ‘Man, his rights and freedoms are the supreme value.  
The recognition, observance and protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen shall be the obligation 
of the State.’ http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-02.htm, accessed:23.09.16; Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China, Article 4, …The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and 
upholds and develops a relationship of equality, unity and mutual assistance among all of China’s nationalities…. 
and Article33,’The State respects and preserves human rights.’ 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm, accessed:23.09.16. The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, Article 10,’The State shall strive to...protect and take care of all its individuals…and Article 26,’The State 
will protect human rights according to the norms of the Islamic Shari’a.’ (1993) 8 Arab L Q 258. 
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recognition of a new norm but rather an acknowledgement of what was already the status quo.16  
If there are ‘catastrophic internal wrongs’ that constitute a threat to international peace and 
security, the Council can authorise military action under Chapter VII.17   The international 
aspect of R2P is not a legal norm; there is neither sufficient state practice nor opinio juris to 
support it as such.18   
 
How R2P has developed  
 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s 2009 report ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect’ 
(2009 Report) set out a three-pillar strategy for advancing the agenda set out at the World 
Summit.19  This expanded on the brief paragraphs in the WSO and envisaged a three-pronged 
approach towards a single objective of operationalizing the responsibility to protect.  The three 
elements of the strategy were intended to be complementary, not sequential and of ‘equal size, 
strength and viability’.20 
 
Pillar one is the primary protection responsibility of each state: 
The responsibility to protect, first and foremost, is a matter of state responsibility, 
because protection begins at home and the protection of populations is a defining 
attribute of sovereignty and statehood in the twenty-first century.21   
 
Pillars two and three cover what is acknowledged as, at best, the supplemental role of the 
international community.22 Pillar two covers the international assistance23 and capacity-
building24 elements and pillar three, ‘timely and decisive response’25 by the international 
community when prevention falls short and there is manifest failure to protect. 
 
The scope of what was described as Pillar three had been tightly delineated in paragraph 139 
of the WSO as ‘the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter’ along with readiness: 
to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, 
in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
                                                          
16 A more secure world: our shared responsibility, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel, 
A/59/565(2004), paras. 202&203. 
17 UN Charter (n8). 
18 Spencer Zifcak ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ in Malcolm D. Evans (ed) International Law (4th ed Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2014) 510. 
19 Implementing the responsibility to protect, Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/677, 2009. 
20 Ibid 2. 
21 Ibid 10, para 14. 
22 Ibid. 
23 WSO (n4) para 138 ‘The international community should (…) encourage and help’. 
24 Ibid para 139 ‘helping States build capacity to protect’. 
25 2009 Report (n19) 2. 
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inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.26  
  
This emphasises that any action which would be a use of force under article 2(4) must be 
undertaken through the Council and not unilaterally (whether by individual states or 
collectively).   
 
While the Council has this primary role, the General Assembly (Assembly) was tasked by the 
WSO with continuing consideration of the principle and its implications, and the extent to 
which it has done so will be considered further below.27 
 
In R2P’s evolution from the ICISS conception in 2001 through to the text agreed by states at 
the World Summit in 2005, innovative elements were lost.  ICISS saw the re-characterisation 
from a ‘right to intervene’ to a ‘responsibility to protect’28 evolving from the acknowledgement 
of an internal as well as an external aspect of sovereignty. States not only respect each other’s 
sovereignty (external) but also ‘the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state’ 
(internal), that is, ‘sovereignty as responsibility’.29   
 
ICISS anticipated that a set of precautionary principles would be considered before a military 
intervention for human protection purposes was undertaken and hoped that the permanent five 
members of the Council would agree to temper their use of the veto.  ICISS also envisaged that 
if the Council failed ‘to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations 
crying out for action’ states may take matters into their own hands.30 
 
These elements did not survive; what is left is a policy statement grounded and delineated by 
international law. However, despite agreement by consensus in 2005, both the scope of the 
policy and its implementation continue to be discussed.  The 2012 Report of the Secretary-
General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka Report) 
noted that ‘[d]iffering perceptions among Member States and the Secretariat of the concept’s 
meaning and use had become so contentious as to nullify its potential value’ and that referring 
to it was more likely to weaken UN action than strengthen it.31   
Looking at what the principle means today, a review of the statements of the thirty-nine states 
and groups of states which participated in the Thematic Panel Discussion on 26 February 2016, 
                                                          
26 WSO (n4) para 139.  The words echo ‘manifestly failed’ in para 430, Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), 
Judgement, I C J Reports 2007 43, 220. 
27 WSO (n4) para 139. 
28 ICISS (n2), 11, para 2.4. 
29  Ibid 8, para 1.35. 
30 Ibid XII and XIII, ‘Principles for Military Intervention’. 
31 November 2012, 26, para 74, 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/The_Internal_Review_Panel_report_on_Sri_Lanka.pdf 
accessed: 18.11.16.  The Secretary-General appointed a Panel of Experts to advise him on accountability during 
the war in Sri Lanka’s final stages and its memorandum, which “described the failure to act by Member States as 
a low mark for the UN”, prompted the establishment by the Secretary-General of the Internal Review Panel. (4, 
paras 1 and 2).   
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to mark the tenth anniversary of the adoption of R2P at the World Summit, shows that 
criticisms articulated during the principle’s conception still linger.   
 
The scope for intervention is a key concern: ‘[the international community] cannot violate 
respect for sovereignty by providing interference in internal affairs’ (China)32 and: 
[W]e still, and as much as many other countries, have legitimate concerns that the 
notion of Responsibility to Protect may be manipulated for political objectives aimed 
at intervening in the internal affairs of some member states. (Egypt).33     
 
There are also questions over how R2P interacts with existing mechanisms:   
[W]e would like to ask why the international community shouldn’t rely on existing 
mechanisms such as the annual periodic reviews in the UNHCR to serve as the 
international community’s early warning and preventative systems against atrocity 
crimes (India)34 and: 
We would be interested to hear your thoughts on the operational interplay and 
synergies, both in New York and at the national level, between the implementation of 
the responsibility to protect and other similar concepts, for example Protection of 
Civilians, Early Warning, Atrocity Prevention, International Criminal Justice? (Nordic 
countries).35  
 
‘International R2P’:  towards a legal norm? 
 
Before moving to how the principle has been put into practice, its status – whether it has 
developed into more than simply a policy statement – will be briefly discussed. 
 
Prima facie, it might seem that R2P would be strengthened if, through state practice and opinio 
juris, it developed into a legal norm and thereby had more than a moral imperative.  Without 
crystallising into a legal norm, the fundamental notion of responsibility bringing with it 
obligations cannot come into play; there is then no accountability for failure to meet an 
international responsibility.  
 
It is apparent that R2P is hardly off the starting blocks in this respect.  States, principally but 
not exclusively China, consistently reaffirm the need for respect for a state’s sovereignty, which 
blocks interventions without consent.36 
 
The ICJ noted, in the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide case, that ‘the duty to prevent 
places states under positive obligations, to do their best to ensure that such acts do not occur’.37  
                                                          
32 General Assembly, Seventieth Session, Thematic Panel, GA/11764, 26 February 2016 
www.globalr2p.org/media/file s/china-26-feb.pdf, accessed: 15.11.16. 
33 Ibid www.globalr2p.org/media/files/egypt-26-feb.pdf, accessed: 15.11.16. 
34 Ibid www.globalr2p.org/media/files/india-26-feb.pdf, accessed: 15.11.16. 
35 Ibid www.globalr2p.org/media/files/denmark-nordic-countries-26-feb-1.pdf, accessed: 15.11.16. 
36 S/PV.6498 (17.03.11) 10. 
37 Genocide case (n26) 223 (albeit that the Court confined itself to determining the specific scope of the duty to 
prevent in the Genocide Convention, 220, para 429). 
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There are then questions of where positive obligations lie – equally or dependent on 
geographical contiguity or resource levels? Is a legal determination (and by whom) required 
before acting?  To whom, and how, would failures to fulfil an international R2P be identified, 
allocated, measured and assessed within the State Responsibility framework?38  There is also 
the issue of whether international R2P has any real meaning for weak or under-resourced states, 
given that it can never be realised by such states.  Furthermore, even if all these questions are 
answered to the satisfaction of the international community as a whole, as Merrills points out, 
state responsibility has not proved satisfactory in encouraging performance, which is R2P’s 
crucial feature.39 
 
It thus seems extremely unlikely that R2P is near crystallisation as a legal norm. To suggest 
otherwise would be premature and constitute a distraction from areas where there could be 
progress.   
 
When the Council acted:  Libya 
 
The intervention in Libya in 2011 is widely regarded as the first military intervention to protect 
a civilian population without the consent of the host state.40  Earlier actions were not considered 
as such because of their particular characteristics.  For example, in 1992, Somalia was a failed 
state with no capacity to give consent.41   
 
Acting in Libya followed a situation in Darfur where the refusal of state consent to transition 
from an overstretched African Union Mission (AMIS) to a UN mission was an obstacle to 
progress for many months, until a hybrid UN- African Union force was accepted.42   
 
Supporters of R2P saw Libya as its first success; it demonstrated that the Council can and will 
intervene to protect populations from mass atrocities when the host state manifestly fails to 
protect its population or threatens to be the perpetrator. 
 
Other commentators see Libya as not necessarily an ‘R2P action’.43 The key Council 
resolutions concerning Libya, Resolution 197044 and Resolution 197345, refer only to Libya’s 
                                                          
38 Carsten Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political rhetoric or emerging legal norm?’ 101 The American Journal 
of International Law 99. 
39 J. G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (5th ed Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011) 79. 
40 Although measures under Chapter VII of the Charter do not require consent. 
41 Zifcak notes that the ‘UN Secretary-General later expressed his opinion that the Somalia operation constituted 
a new precedent for the Council.  It had, for the first time, authorized a military intervention for purely 
humanitarian purposes’ (n18) 512. 
42 Alex de Waal, ‘Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect’ (2007) 83(6) International Affairs 1039, 
1042. 
43 eg Robert Murray, ‘Resolution 1973 was predicated on humanitarian protection, but vague references and 
hopeful connections are not enough to qualify the mission in Libya as an extension of the R2P doctrine.’ Aidan 
Hehir, Robert Murray (eds) Libya The Responsibility to Protect and the future of Humanitarian Intervention 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2013) 222.  
44 S/RES/1970(2011), passed unanimously. 




responsibility to protect, not to any wider international responsibility.  The ambiguity around 
what constitutes an international R2P action46 weakens the principle, as assessing its success 
or otherwise remains handicapped by the lack of clarity as to what it actually is.   
 
Whether or not Libya was evidence of R2P in action, the death of Muammar al-Gaddafi and 
the regime change which followed the intervention by the multi-state coalition served to stall 
R2P’s development.  Russian Federation representative, Mr Churkin, said in the debate on 
resolution 1973 that:  ‘Provisions were introduced into the text that could potentially open the 
door to large-scale military intervention’.47  The abstentions of Russia and China which 
allowed the resolution to pass were the result of diplomatic compromise that limited the use of 
force to protection of civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.48  It was 
widely perceived that the mandate was subsequently manipulated to use force beyond that 
required for civilian protection - to facilitate regime change and breach the arms embargo to 
arm the opposition.49  
 
Controversy over the implementation of Resolution 1973, and the great difficulties in Libya 
five years on, restricts its use as a precedent for similar action by the Council.  To the extent 
that R2P has been associated with Libya, it has been tainted; for its opponents, the link of R2P 
to intervention has been strengthened.50 
 
Commitment at domestic level 
 
For R2P to truly blossom it must be grounded not only in oratory at international level, but in 
absorption into national policy and debate.51  The UK, in its 2015 National Security Strategy 
and Strategic Defence and Security Review states ‘We will use UN mechanisms such as the 
                                                          
46 ie within the meaning of para 139 of the WSO. 
47 S/PV.6498 (17.03.11) 8. 
48 (n45) and Philip Alston, Ryan Goodman (eds) International Human Rights Texts and Materials (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2013) 751-758. 
49 Ibid Alston/Goodman. 
50 eg Statement of Venezuela, 8th Informal Interactive Dialogue of the UN General Assembly on Responsibility 
to Protect, 6 September 2016, ‘Security Council authorized intervention in Libya did not put an end to violence 
and had the unintended effect of exacerbating tensions on the ground and causing more harm than good to the 




51 US National Security Strategy 2015, 22, ‘We affirm our support for the international consensus that 
governments have the responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities and that this responsibility passes to 
the broader international community when those governments manifestly fail to protect their populations.’ 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf; French White Paper 
Defence and National Security 2013, 23-24, ‘The consensus on the Responsibility to Protect, as expressed at the 
World Summit in 2005, remains fragile, but France intends to make consolidation of this principle a priority of 
its external action.’ http://www.rpfrance-otan.org/White-Paper-on-defence-and, cf no mention of R2P:  China’s 
military strategy 2015, ‘With the growth of national strength, China’s armed forces will gradually intensify their 
participation in such operations as international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and do their utmost to 
shoulder more international responsibilities and obligations…’ http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-
05/26/content_20820628.htm,  and Russian National Security Strategy, December 2015, 
http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-
31Dec2015.pdf; all accessed: 24.09.16 
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Responsibility to Protect, Rights Up Front [sic], the Human Rights Council, and the Children 
in Armed Conflict agenda to drive global change, in line with British values’.52  This affirms 
statements at the UN.53  However, if R2P is not in reality any part of national vocabularies or, 
indeed worse, is seen as providing a tool for intervention54 – then its progression towards 
acceptance throughout the international community is stymied. 
 
A review of Hansard on 18 March 2011,55 the day after Resolution 1973 was passed, and three 
days later, when in the main debate on Libya the Commons voted in overwhelming support of 
that Resolution,56 shows that while there were references to R2P from the Opposition and from 
two backbench Liberal Democrats,57 there were none from the Government itself.  Although 
Prime Minister David Cameron, who opened the debate, talked repeatedly of the action as one 
to protect civilians and Foreign Secretary William Hague closing the debate echoed this, 
neither framed these references within R2P.   
 
The September 2016 report of the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, which 
examined the intervention in Libya and its aftermath, also makes no reference to R2P.58 
 
                                                          
52 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, Cm 9161, 63, para 5.109, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence
_and_Security_Review.pdf, accessed: 20.11.16. 
53 eg Statement of UK Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Matthew Rycroft, 8th Informal 




54 eg ‘The British government has said that any action in Syria will comply with international law, and the most 
likely way to achieve this might be to claim that military action is for humanitarian purposes, using the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine.  This remains controversial, however, without a United Nations Security 
Council resolution to authorise it.’ Iraq, Syria and ISIS - recent developments SNIA/6977 25 September 2014, 
32, House of Commons Library, Research briefing, 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06977#fullreport,  accessed: 21.09.16.   
55 UN Security Council Resolution Debate, Commons Chamber, 18 March 2011, Volume 525, Column 611. 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-03-
18/debates/11031850000007/UNSecurityCouncilResolution(Libya)?highlight=Responsibility%20Protect%20Li
bya#contribution-11031850000195, accessed: 19.11.16. 
56 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 Debate, Commons Chamber, 21 March 2011, Volume 525, 
Column 700, (Vote-Ayes:557, Noes:13, Columns 803-806), https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2011-03-
21/debates/1103219000001/UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution1973?highlight=Responsibility%20Protect
%20Libya#contribution-1103219000331, accessed:19.11.16.  Note that Ed Miliband, then Leader of the 
Opposition, discusses four cautionary tests of “right intention, last resort, proportionate means and reasonable 
prospects” (at Column 716) but these are taken from ICISS and are not part of the agreed WSO. 
57 The minority party in the Coalition Government. 
58 Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK’s future policy options, House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report of Session 2016-17, HC119, 14 September 2016. 
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Looking at more recent Commons activity, in 2016, R2P was mentioned in debates on Libya,59 
the genocide of minorities by Daesh,60 the Report of the Iraq Inquiry61 and Syria,62 principally 
by voices from the Opposition benches.  Whether R2P is just ‘hot air’63 and the need for a UN 
capable of giving effect to it were issues raised.64  Commenting on the latter, Prime Minister 
David Cameron: 
There is a question sometimes about how can something be morally right but legally 
wrong.  We therefore need to make sure we keep looking at reforming the United 
Nations, so we can bring those two things together.65 
 
This review, albeit very limited, of Commons debates indicates that although the UK 
Government confirms its priority to prevent atrocities,66 it does not do so by referring to R2P.  
The sensitivity of governments to avoiding trespass into another state’s sovereignty, along with 
other diplomatic and political considerations, also inhibits articulation of international R2P.  
This excerpt from an exchange in the House of Commons in 2016 is an illustration:  
The tragic recent history of Kashmir arose from the partition of India, which was 
managed by Britain after world war two.  Does not Britain therefore have a special 
responsibility to help to find a solution to Kashmir’s troubles and the suffering of the 
Kashmiri people?  (Kelvin Hopkins, MP Luton North) 
 
The UK of course has very good relations with both India and Pakistan, but our long-
standing position, held by successive Governments of all hues, is that it is for India and 
Pakistan to find a lasting resolution to the situation, taking into account the wishes of 
                                                          
59 Libya Debate, Commons Chamber, 19 April 2016, Volume 608, Column 793, 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2016-04-
19/debates/16041932000001/Libya?highlight=Responsibility%20Protect#contribution-443B946C-7C46-4C03-
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the Kashmiri people.  It is not for the UK to prescribe a solution or act as mediator.  
(Alok Sharma, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs) 67  
 
When actions fall short:  Syria 
 
In Libya, the Council did act.  In Syria, its actions so far have been disastrously inadequate.  
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addressed the Council in September 2016: 
The Syrian tragedy shames us all.  The collective failure of the international community 
should haunt every member of the Security Council (…) 
We are at a make-or-break moment.  I challenge everyone to use their influence now to 
restore our cessation of hostilities, enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance 
everywhere it is needed, and support the United Nations in charting a political path for 
the Syrians to negotiate a way out of the hell in which they are trapped.  In their service 
as members of the Security Council, those present have no higher responsibility now.68 
 
The situation in Syria was, and is, very different from that in Libya.  The speed with which the 
Council acted in Libya had been notable. In Syria, although protests against the Bashar al-
Assad regime began in January 2011 and quickly escalated, there has been a deep-set and bitter 
conflict between political approaches among the Council.69  Progress has been made in respect 
of eliminating the use of chemical weapons and – at times - gaining access for aid delivery. 
Crucially, though, an unprecedented four double-vetoes have paralysed the Council’s actions 
in critical areas and severely limited its responses to the continuing humanitarian crisis.70  As 
Deputy-Secretary-General Jan Eliasson acknowledged: ‘our collective response to the Syrian 
crisis has been a catastrophic failure’.71   
 
It is very apparent that the Council response to the crisis in Libya, or more specifically, how 
that response was implemented in practice, influenced Russia and China in Council discussions 
regarding Syria. China continues to consistently and firmly assert the fundamental importance 
of sovereignty.  In discussions on the first of the draft resolutions subject to a double veto in 
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October 2011, Mr Li Baodong notes: ‘The international community should (…) fully respect 
Syria’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity’.72  Mr Churkin commented, in the 
same debate:  
The situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan 
experience.  The international community is alarmed by statements that compliance 
with Security Council resolutions in Libya in the NATO interpretation is a model for 
the future actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility to protect.73 
 
In the debate in February 2012 on the second double-veto draft resolution Mr Churkin said that 
he considered the possibility of a political settlement to be undermined by those ‘calling for 
regime change’.74   
 
Feelings have been as strong on the other side of the debate.  For example, the French 
representative Mr Arraud stated in the same debate: 
For the past 10 months, we have been accused of seeking regime change and preparing 
for military intervention.  That is patently false.  In this Chamber, three days ago, our 
Ministers confirmed that there was no question of imposing a political regime on 
Syria.75  
 
The deadlock in Council shows no sign of easing, on the contrary, Russia scheduled a vote on 
a draft resolution of its own to follow that of the draft resolution put forward by France and 
Spain in early October 2016.76  Neither passed, Russia cast its fifth veto to defeat France and 
Spain’s draft and its own gained only four votes in favour.77   
 
The political stalemate on key aspects of Council deliberations on Syria shows that the tensions 
between sovereignty and intervention to protect endure; this is unsurprising given that there 
has been no fundamental change in the international law landscape or the political perspectives 
of Council permanent members.  The scope for the international community to act in 
circumstances of manifest failure to protect, however, was framed firmly within the Charter 
and international law;78 it is hard to see how these opposing tensions will ease. 
 
The broader Council practice  
 
The continuing debate over the interpretation of R2P has been touched on.  Upon examining 
the Council’s resolutions, the limited extent to which the Council demonstrates it has R2P in 
mind in its decision making process can be seen.  It is by no means clear that the international 
element of the R2P is in any way securely anchored in this process. 
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The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect has identified fifty resolutions and fourteen 
Presidential Statements referencing R2P.79  The majority of these – thirty-two (including 
resolutions on Libya and Syria) – and all but two of the Presidential Statements - refer only to 
the primary responsibility of the relevant state.   
 
Of the seven resolutions80 referencing the full R2P, five give little more than a cursory nod to 
paragraphs 138 and 139.  The other two are more comprehensive, particularly Resolution 2150, 
unanimously adopted, which is a call to states to recommit to prevent and fight against the 
crime of genocide and other serious crimes under international law.  It refers specifically to the 
principle as a whole and acknowledges the important role played by regional and sub regional 
arrangements and especially notes article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.     
 
Six resolutions refer to states’ primary responsibility to protect and also refer to the role of the 
international community to encourage and help states to exercise their responsibility.81  The 
remaining five reaffirm other resolutions with R2P content.82    
 
The overall impression is that Council attention is very much on the primary responsibility 
with, at most - and infrequently -, lip service paid to the wider principle.  This again points 
back to the question of whether international R2P in its entirety can be fully realised. 
 
That said, even primary R2P has recently come under pressure.  In order for Council members 
to reach agreement to adopt the June 2016 Presidential Statement on Women and peace and 
security,83 previously agreed language had to be diluted: 
(…) any specific reference to resolution 2171, including language from that resolution 
recalling member states’ primary responsibility to prevent conflict, protect civilians and 
respect the human rights of individuals within their territory and under their jurisdiction, 
was removed in order to reach consensus.84 
 
This suggests no loosening of the grip of sovereignty.85  It is too early to see if it represents a 
‘blip’ in Council practice or will be a precedent in future statements and resolutions. 
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Council reform: the way to unfetter R2P? 
 
Over the years there have been calls for a reform of Council procedures, with no success.  One 
of the most recent initiatives is a code of conduct within the framework of the Accountability, 
Coherence and Transparency Group, by which states pledge, in particular, not to ‘vote against 
a credible draft resolution before the Security Council on timely and decisive action to end the 
commission of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, or to prevent such crimes’.86  
As of 14 December 2015, 107 have signed up; including two Council permanent members, 
France and the UK.  All five would be needed for this initiative to succeed.   
 
The Secretary-General in his 2009 Report clarified that the privileged status (‘tenure’ and ‘veto 
power’) of the five permanent members carried responsibility with it.87  He urged them not to 
‘employ or threaten to employ the veto in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations 
relating to the responsibility to protect’.88  Without the agreement of all five permanent 
members to commit to reform, it seems unlikely there will be any changes in Council practice. 
 
That being so, a look beyond the Council is needed to assess whether there are capabilities 
elsewhere to advance R2P. 
 
The role of the Assembly in implementing R2P 
 
The World Summit tasked the Assembly with the limited role of continued consideration of 
R2P and its implications. Since 2005, it has done this through activity in the Assembly itself 
and the Human Rights Council.  Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented eight annual 
reports to the Assembly, from 2009 to 2016.  These covered implementation,89 early warning 
and assessment,90 regional and sub-regional arrangements91, ‘timely and decisive response’92, 
state responsibility and prevention93, international assistance94, implementation (taking stock 
10 years on)95 and mobilising collective action.96  However, while the Assembly has thus 
technically met its remit, the consensus Heads of state and government were able to reach back 
in 2005 did not set any measurable targets.  It is not therefore unexpected that progress has not 
been commensurate with the level of paper and debate generated. 
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It is not even clear that the continued consideration by the Assembly has strengthened 
consensus on R2P.  The Russian Federation, in its statement at the Informal Interactive 
Dialogue discussing the 2016 Report, with Libya in mind, concluded the contrary.97  
 
The 2016 report was Ban Ki-moon’s last as Secretary-General, and in it he expressed his hope 
that his successor will accelerate implementation of R2P.98  Recognising that this has drifted 
off-track and that all the barriers - political divisions, Council disunity, financial pressures and 
so on – remain, he sets core challenges on prevention and on timely and decisive response.  He 
also highlights the importance of preventing recurrence and working towards reconciliation 
and transitional justice. 
 
Harnessing the UN as a whole 
 
The UN has been criticised for siloing and administrative inefficiencies.99 Although R2P and 
the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review Mechanism could operate together 
and both be strengthened, synergies will not be achieved unless there is a conscious effort by 
states, regional organisations and those within the UN to integrate R2P into their thinking. 
 
To consider just three among the many UN mechanisms and initiatives, first, in late 2013, Ban 
Ki-moon introduced his own initiative, ‘Human Rights up Front’ (HRuF).100  This aims to 
ensure that the UN system takes early, effective action to ‘prevent or respond to large-scale 
violations of human rights or international humanitarian law’ and to encourage UN staff ‘to 
take a principled stance and to act with moral courage to prevent serious and large-scale 
violations’.101  It was introduced in a much more low-key way than the very high profile setting 
of the World Summit and is designed to be informal and light, to ‘help the United Nations 
operate in a more cohesive, cross-cutting, horizontal manner’.102  If HRuF is effective in 
tackling lower level human rights violations than the mass atrocities R2P addresses, this could 
help cut mass atrocities off at the knees. 
 
Secondly, the ‘Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes’ (Framework) developed by the 
Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on Genocide and on R2P in 2014 aims to be a practical 
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tool to identify risk factors indicative of potential mass atrocities.103  Again, if it is used and is 
effective, it should enhance prevention. 
 
And thirdly, the 2009 Report identified the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism of 
the Human Rights Council as a potentially important instrument for indirectly advancing goals 
relating to R2P.104  Its purpose is to allow for a review of the human rights records of all 193 
member states of the UN, in turn, every five years and it is in its second cycle.   
 
Its universal scope and co-operative approach (if used in good faith) are strengths but it seems 
the hoped-for potential for UPR must be realised at the early warning stage.  The first review 
of Syria took place in October 2011 when the country was already in crisis.105  The calls for an 
immediate end to the repression and violence against civilians were rejected by Syria and the 
US’ condemnation of gross violations of human rights, its observation that ‘mass arrests, 
arbitrary detentions, torture and targeted killings by the Government continued unabated’ and 
its call for President Assad ‘to step aside immediately’106 were considered ‘interference in the 
domestic affairs of Syria’.107 
 
The role of the Secretary General 
 
The Secretary-General, supported by the Secretariat and Special Advisers on the Prevention of 
Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect,108 has been a driver of R2P and 2017 sees the 
new Secretary-General, Antόnio Guterres, take office.  In his opening remarks in the informal 
dialogue before the Assembly in April 2016 he made clear the importance he places on 
prevention: 
TV cameras are not there when a crisis is avoided and so it is natural that it is difficult 
for governments and for international organisations to have prevention as a priority, but 
I believe prevention must be not only a priority but the priority of everything we do.  
And that of course demands a huge cultural change and a true revolution in global 
advocacy.109 
 
In light of the international community’s failures in conflict prevention and resolution and in 
thwarting global terrorism, and in circumstances where ‘power relations are becoming less 
clear’ and ‘leadership is becoming also a more complex concept’, Mr Guterres envisages an 
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expanded role for the Secretary-General,110 making more active use of the good offices 
function.111  The extent to which he is allowed to do so will of course depend on member states. 
 
Looking forward:  the key elements to align in order to activate R2P 
 
The fifteen years since the World Summit Outcome have shown that the Council does not 
recognise R2P as giving it any new grounds to act.  The barriers to ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
still stand firm against military intervention for human protection purposes.  Realisation of 
pillar three of R2P therefore remains exceedingly problematic and a severing of the link 
between R2P and intervention without consent seems a necessary first step to re-building 
consensus on R2P. 
 
Acknowledging that R2P is not, and is unlikely to be, a legal norm, its status as a policy 
statement and moral imperative means it can nevertheless be influential.  Organisations outside 
the UN, such as the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the International 
Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect have been active here and civil society and media 
pressure on governments can be a potent influence. 
 
The Sri Lanka Report identified the ‘single most effective UN action to protect civilians from 
gross human rights violations’ as ‘early and robust political consensus among UN Member 
States in favour of protection’.112  There is widespread acceptance of states’ primary 
responsibility to protect their own populations.  There is also broad consensus on the 
importance of early warning and prevention in reducing not only the human cost of mass 
atrocities (of course the primary aim of R2P), but also the costs of re-building after such crimes 
have been committed.  Although practical support from the international community at these 
early stages still requires the consent of the receiving state, this is likely to arise in situations 
that are not quite as highly charged.  Nonetheless there still remain significant limitations even 
here:  where a state is – or seems likely to be – the perpetrator, failed states, and non-state actors 
and organised armed groups who are not cognisant of international law or choose to operate 
outside it. 
 
The key element, building on consensus, is putting protection into practice.  The mechanisms 
to do so are already there.  More effective and sensitive use of them is needed:  the UN 
assimilating HRuF throughout its operations, regional organisations providing the impetus for 
neighbouring states to cooperate and support each other and states using tools and mechanisms 
like the Framework and the Universal Periodic Review, and demonstrating their commitment 
to R2P in their foreign policy discussions at the domestic level.   
 
A shift of emphasis from international to regional support may be beneficial in potentially 
defusing some of the tensions that come with support offered from states which are judged to 
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have motives other than altruism.  Engagement with R2P at international, regional and national 
level would strengthen consensus around the principle.  However, this is a utopian ideal in a 
world where 65.3 million people were displaced at the end of 2015, up almost ten per cent from 
the previous year, and where the political mood in the developed world is tending towards 
introspection rather than global outreach.113 
 
The level of commitment of the new Secretary-General to R2P, and his ability to extend the 
good offices role, may also be influential in keeping R2P front of mind but experience since 
2005 has unfortunately demonstrated that without widespread state support this is not of itself 
enough. 
 
The final important factor in activating R2P is efforts directed towards ending impunity and 
the powerful message of deterrence and dissuasion that could send to potential perpetrators.  
The 2009 Report identified the International Criminal Court (ICC) and UN-assisted tribunals 
as an essential tool for implementing R2P.114  However, support for the ICC, which has already 
weathered a difficult birth and gestation, is currently moving in the wrong direction with South 
Africa, Burundi and Gambia deciding to withdraw from the Rome Statute115 and the planned 




R2P has been extremely fertile ground for debate since its genesis in 2001.  However, the 
initial, ambitious scope envisaged by ICISS was significantly diluted en-route to the principle’s 
agreement by Heads of state and government in 2005.  Council practice to date confirms that 
although a state’s primary responsibility to protect its population is accepted and has been 
regularly reaffirmed, a broader, international responsibility is not.  There remains lack of clarity 
around what is and is not action taken on the basis of R2P, with Libya an example here.117  It 
has been hailed as a success for R2P while others argue that R2P was at most only a single 
factor in the decision of the Council to take action.  Subsequent stretching of the mandate cast 
a shadow over R2P and confirmed to detractors – rightly or wrongly given that it is arguable 
whether Libya was an ‘R2P action’ - that it could be used as a tool to facilitate western 
hegemony.118  This perception of the misuse of R2P fed into Council response to the 
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humanitarian crisis in Syria leading to widespread criticism of Council inaction while mass 
atrocities are perpetrated there.   
 
It seems very clear that Libya did not represent a precedent for military intervention without 
consent to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against 
humanity.  States remain extremely reluctant to intervene.  As Shaw notes ‘[p]erhaps the 
outstanding characteristic of a state is its independence or sovereignty’119 and this is defended 
fiercely.  The provisions of article 2(4) and (7) along with the veto power continue to protect 
state sovereignty tightly.  Their combined effectiveness suggests that the full scope of the 
international element of R2P is inherently flawed in that it does not have the capacity to be 
fully realised within the confines of international law and Council realpolitik.  In addition, state 
practice and opinio juris give no indication that the international responsibility element of R2P 
will develop into a legal norm.  Moral opprobrium remains the only basis on which the 
international community can be called to account for not meeting its responsibility to protect. 
 
The answer to the humanitarian intervention dilemma which thus still remains – the ‘bridging 
of the gap’ ‘between what is requisite in strict legality and what is generally regarded as just 
and moral’120 – may well best lie, as Franck described: 
Not as a new legal right (…) but as a mitigating circumstance that does not create law 
and which is recognised as purely circumstantial and discretionary relief, rather like the 
early uses of equity.121 
 
As for R2P, a bleak outlook would see it lost among other competing initiatives, without a 
champion to continue to bring it forward.  Although not short of supporters outside the UN, it 
may wither through inertia or lack of resources within.  More optimistically, however, it has 
shown itself capable of evolving over its fifteen-year life and it may continue to do so.  
However, as the polarity within the Council seems to be hardening rather than easing, it seems 
inevitable – and indeed essential - that there must be ‘exclusion of hard pillar 3 responses from 
the R2P repertoire’122 for true consensus to be arrived at and maintained.   
 
R2P can act as a rallying call to enhance efforts to prevent mass atrocities and provide a 
framework for states to encourage, support and assist other states to meet their responsibilities 
to their own populations.  However, in order for R2P to really make a difference, emphasis 
must now shift from talk to action with focus firmly on prevention and strengthening early 
warning capability through more effective and sensitive use of existing mechanisms and 
initiatives and a change of emphasis from international to regional assistance. 
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The Sri Lanka Report noted that R2P’s greatest contribution in practice may be as a ‘process 
to help facilitate the emergence among Member States of early consensus on human rights 
protection’.123 Although this is a very long way from the ICISS conception, and would fall far 
short of those early hopes for the principle, it would be an achievement in itself.  
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